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Abstract
The misinformation effect is one of the major threats for the quality of witness testimony. It
involves including of information that is inconsistent with the course of an event, and which
originates from sources other than the event itself, into a witness’s report of the event. In the
present article research is presented aiming at reducing the tendency to rely on misinforma-
tion. After viewing a video clip, participants received a post-event narrative describing the
events in the film which in the misled group included some incorrect information about the
clip. They were then administered reinforced self-affirmation (RSA), a technique aiming at
boosting self-confidence in order to increase the tendency to rely on own memory instead of
external cues. This technique consists of self-affirmation by means of writing down one’s
greatest achievements in life and manipulated positive feedback. Feedback about memory,
perception and independence of judgements was analyzed. All types of feedback effectively
reduced the misinformation effect. Mediation analyzes confirmed that RSA operates via
increased self-confidence or self-independence.
Introduction
The aim of the article is to present the technique of reinforced self-affirmation, in various vari-
ants, as a method of immunization against misinformation in the context of witness testimony.
Developing methods to improve the quality of human testimony is important as it provides
important evidence in court [1,2,3,4]. However, witness testimonies are often unreliable and
inaccurate (e.g. [5,6,7]), which is due to the natural conditions in which human memory oper-
ates [8,9]. Moreover, a witness is often confident in the accuracy of his or her objectively incor-
rect testimony. Meta-analyses show that the correlation between the witness’s confidence and
the accuracy of his or her testimony is either statistically insignificant [10] or significant, but
weak [11,12]. However, a confident witness seems to be more credible to the court [13]. Obvi-
ously, erroneous testimony can have significant social consequences.
The mechanisms by which errors enter witness testimony are varied. One of them is the
misinformation effect. It is defined as the inclusion of information that is inconsistent with the
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course of an event, and which originates from sources other than the event itself, into a wit-
ness’s report of the event [14]. This effect is sometimes described as one of the most important
discoveries of psychology [15], and its significant impact on memory functioning is also
pointed out [16].
The most frequently used procedure to investigate the effect of misinformation consists of
three stages [6,17]. First, the original material is presented(the equivalent of the event the wit-
ness later testifies about). Then, after some time, the subjects are presented with the postevent
material, which in the experimental group contains information that is incongruent with the
original event. The last step is the test of the memory of the original material.
There are two broad types of reasons why people give in to misinformation. The first one
includes some malfunction of the memory process. Theories based on this assumption include,
among others, parallel traces theory [18], the CHARM model [19], fuzzy trace theory [20],
activation-based theory [21], retrieval-induced forgetting [22], memory reconsolidation [23],
and the source misattribution theory [24,25,7]. The second class of theories do not assume that
memory malfunction is necessary for the misinformation effect to occur [26] and point out
that it is possible that a witness testifies in accordance with the misinformation in spite of the
fact that they remember all information necessary to provide correct testimony [5,27,28,29].
For example, if a yellow car was visible in the video, subsequently described as red, some par-
ticipants may think that they saw a yellow car, but they also believe the car was red in the
description of the story. When asked about the colour of the car in the video, such participants
experience obvious subjective discrepancies which they have to resolve. Some participants
choose to ignore the postevent material and to rely on their own memories. As a consequence,
they give the correct answer—the car was yellow. Some other however misbelieve their memo-
ries, assume that the description must have been correct, and give a wrong answer based on it
—that the car was red.
In the light of existing research the main reason for yielding to misinformation by people
aware of the discrepancies between the original material and the misinformation is doubt in
their own memory [5]. This article presents research on a technique of immunizing against
misinformation which aim at increasing the confidence of a witness as regards some particular
psychological properties reinforced self-affirmation (RSA).
RSA combines two techniques: self-affirmation and positive feedback. It was designed for
the kind of eyewitnesses mentioned above—those who remember correctly the original event
yet tend to report information consistent with the erroneous postevent material rather. It is
based on the assumption mentioned above—that one of the main reasons why a witness yields
to misinformation is doubting the accuracy of their own memoirs [5,30]. It may be assumed
that in the case of people who have a correct memory of the original material the increase in
confidence in the quality of their own memory should result in a decrease in the tendency to
rely on external sources of information.
This assumption is not new. Attempts to strengthen self-confidence or self-esteem with
regard to the functioning of the witness’s memory by giving them positive feedback were
made earlier. For example, Tata and Gudjonsson [31] used positive feedback manipulation in
the context of Gudjonsson’s and Clark’s [32] [33] interrogative suggestibility procedure. The
study found that positive feedback made people less susceptible to suggestions compared with
negative feedback.
The above-mentioned result supports the thesis that an effective technique of immunizing
against misinformation should enhance self-confidence, in particular confidence in the accu-
racy of one’s own memories. Positive feedback should be a component of such a technique,
providing the individual with information about the good quality of the performance on a
task. It has been shown that an individual’s awareness that they have succeeded or failed in
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their task has a significant impact on their behaviour [34], affect [35] and confidence [36,37].
Also, positive feedback about the quality of the current task increases motivation [38] and self-
confidence, including confidence about memory performance [39,40]. In the Szpitalak [41]
study, however, positive feedback alone did not have any impact on susceptibility to misinfor-
mation in the three-stage paradigm described above. Therefore, Szpitalak [41] added a second
component: the act of self-affirmation. It was expected that the individual, focused on the posi-
tive self-characteristics generated internally (by means of self-affirmation), would be more
willing to accept positive feedback as a kind of self-affirmation confirmed externally.
The self-affirmation activity consisted in the respondents writing down their greatest
achievements in life. It has been suggested that concentrating on one’s achievements is an
effective method of self-affirmation [42], and the subject’s belief that he or she has been suc-
cessful in the past increases confidence, just as recollections of experienced failures decreases
confidence [43]. The act of self-affirmation should therefore contribute significantly to the
self-confidence of the subject. It also seems that the subject’s involvement in the act of self-
affirmation fosters a state of self-concentration. This in turn may enhance the efficacy of the
feedback, because the individual focused on the self seems to be more willing to learn about
him or her from the environment [44] and to analyze it more carefully [45].
In sum, it has been empirically demonstrated that both positive feedback [36] and self-
affirmation [46] increase self-confidence. Self-confidence, in turn, is a positive predictor of
the level of performance on a task [34]. In the area of forensic psychology, the relationship
between a witness’s self-confidence and the quality of his or her testimony was also demon-
strated: self-confidence has been found to be negatively linked to susceptibility to sugges-
tions [47] and to memory conformity [48]. It was therefore expected that RSA, combining
positive feedback and self-affirmation would boost self-confidence and therefore promote
relying on one’s own memory and not on external sources, thus endorsing resisting
misinformation.
According to existing research, RSA is effective in reducing the misinformation effect
[41,49,50] and susceptibility to suggestions in the paradigm of interrogative suggestibility [51].
However, not every kind of positive feedback proved effective. So far, it was demonstrated that
RSA was effective when it included positive feedback concerning memory quality (that is, the
area related to the task at hand—the misinformation effect procedure). Positive feedback con-
cerning attention or general ‘morality’ was not effective [52]. In the present paper, the rele-
vance of positive feedback is further explored. It is also analyzed whether RSA really involves
increasing the self-confidence of a person in a specific area.
Aims and hypotheses
The main aim of the present study was to examine whether the positive feedback in the RSA
procedure is effective only when it concerns memory, or whether it may concern other areas,
without losing its effectiveness. The first study explored RSA with feedback concerning mem-
ory (MemRSA) and RSA with feedback about perception abilities (PerRSA). Both were
expected to effectively reduce susceptibility to misinformation, according to the rationale pre-
sented above.
In a similar vein, boosting confidence about perception ability was expected to promote giv-
ing correct answers consistent with one’s own accurate memory. It is possible that when con-
fronting discrepancies with what seems to be one’s own memory and the content of the
postevent material, some participants may be unsure whether they indeed saw a given detail in
the original video clip. Increasing confidence about perception abilities should reduce such
doubts and promote correct answers based on one’s own accurate memory.
Inducing resistance to the misinformation effect by means of reinforced self-affirmation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210987 January 22, 2019 3 / 16
Apart from boosting confidence about memory and perception quality, it was also expected
that activating convictions that one is very independent in their judgements (IndRSA) would
reduce yielding to misinformation. This hypothesis is based on similar reasoning as in the case
of MemRSA and PerRSA and on the same basic premise that there are participants who at the
moment of the final memory test remember both the original and postevent materials. Making
such participants believe that they are independent in their judgements should increase the
tendency to rely on their own memory and therefore decrease the misinformation effect.
In sum, it was hypothesized that: MemRSA increases confidence about memory which in
turn reduces the tendency to ignore one’s own correct memory; PerRSA increases confidence
about perception ability which also in turn reduces to tendency to rely on sources of informa-
tion other than one’s own memory; and IndRSA evokes beliefs that one is independent in their
judgements and this also makes the participants to rely on their own memories. Such hypothe-
ses are mediational in their nature, therefore analyses of mediation were planned. In order to
perform them, measures of confidence in memory and perception ability as well as a measure
of perceived independence in judgements were included in the procedure.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, MemRSA and PerRSA were explored. The main basic hypothesis concerned
the replication of the misinformation effect. If there were no reliable misinformation effect,
any technique aiming at reducing it would be pointless. Therefore, it was expected that the
misinformation effect would be replicated (Hypothesis 1): the mean number of answers con-
sistent with misinformation should be higher in the misled group than in the control one in
which no misinformation was present. Hypothesis 2 stated that MemRSA would be effective:
in the misled group, the mean number of answers consistent with misinformation should be
lower in the MemRSA group than in the control groups in which RSA was not applied
(NoRSA). Similar hypothesis was formulated in the case of PerRSA: in the group in which it
was performed, the mean number of answers consistent with misinformation should be lower
than in the NoRSA group (Hypothesis 3). We also compared the efficacy of MemRSA and
PerRSA even though we did not have a priori hypotheses about the outcome of this compari-
son. As the hypotheses were formulated a priori (in the technical sense, not as a preregistra-
tion), in line with existing recommendations [53,54,55], no overall ANOVA was performed
and instead focused comparisons in the form of planned contrast were calculated. Finally, it
was expected that memory confidence would mediate the relationship between MemRSA and
yielding to misinformation (Hypothesis 4), as well as confidence about perception ability
would mediate the impact of PerRSA on yielding to misinformation (Hypothesis 5).
Methods
Participants. Two hundred and twenty-six participants, students of various schools (138
women, 88 men) aged between 15 and 18 took part in the study (M = 16.6; SD = 0.7). The
experiment was performed during normal classes. The number of participants was determined
a priori in order to have a reasonable chance of detecting weak small effects. Participation was
anonymous, and no reward was given for it. A verbal consent was obtained, as the participa-
tion was announced as fully anonymous, thus making it impossible for the participants to sign
a written consent. Ethical approval for this experiment and Experiment 2 was obtained from
“Komisja Etyki Instytutu Psychologii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego” [Ethical Committee, Insti-
tute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University].
Materials. A four-minute video clip showing burglary and theft was used as the original
material. A short description of the content of the film was used as the postevent material,
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which in the misled group contained six details changed in relation to the content of the film
or added to it. The memory test of the original material consisted of 12 open-ended questions,
six of which referred to the misled details. For example, no gold watches were stolen by the
thieves, the postevent material suggested that they did so, and the question on the final mem-
ory test asked what did the thieves steel (the content of the postevent material and the ques-
tions included in the memory test are given in Supporting Information, S4 and S5 Files).
The RSA procedure consisted of two parts. First, the participants in the experimental
groups had to write down their greatest life achievements. The participants in the control con-
dition wrote down their route from home to school. Afterwards, the participants from the
MemRSA condition were memorizing as many unrelated nouns as possible from a list of 60.
After two minutes the list was removed and answer sheets were distributed. They had num-
bered slots in which the participants were to enter the nouns so that they were able to see how
many items they were able to remember. They were then given manipulated positive feedback
consisting of written information about the average number of nouns seemingly ‘usually
remembered’, which in fact was 1.5 SD lower than the real number, therefore most subjects
scored above ‘the average’. In the control condition, no feedback was given. This task took
about six minutes. In the PerRSA group, instead of memorizing nouns the participants were
asked to mark differences between two abstract images shown to them on a horizontal sheet of
paper. Afterwards they were to count and write on the sheet the number of differences found
and received feedback on their performance which consisted in a mean number of differences
‘usually found’ which in fact was 1.5 SD lower than the real mean established in a pilot study.
Procedure. The research took place during classes in groups of several people. The partici-
pants were informed that the experiment concerned ‘psychological conditions of processing
visual material’. Afterwards, the participants were shown a video clip without sound and com-
pleted some filler questionnaires for 15 minutes. After that they were asked to read a short
description of the film, seemingly ‘in order to answer some questions about the person who
wrote the description’. Next, the RSA procedure was applied. Afterwards, a short questionnaire
in the form of a 100mm visual analogue scale (VAS) was administered. Two of its questions
served as the manipulation check for the RSA manipulations; the first one referred to the con-
fidence about memory: ‘Rate by marking in a vertical line below how confident you feel at this
point that you have a good memory of the content of the film’, the second one—about percep-
tion: ‘Rate by marking in a vertical line below how confident you feel at this point that you
have noticed much of the content of the video’. Finally, the memory test about the original
video clip was administered after which the participants were fully debriefed. At the end of the
experiment, the participants were debriefed. In sum, the study was based on a 2 × 3 experi-
mental design: misinformation (present / absent) × RSA (MemRSA / PerRSA / NoRSA).
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks. As expected, the NoRSA group (M = 57.56, SD = 23.11) had statis-
tically significantly lower memory confidence compared with the MemRSA group (M = 69.81,
SD = 20.85, difference between means (D) = 12.25, F(1, 223) = 12.02, p< .001, ƞ2 = .05) as well
as compared with the PerRSA group (M = 66.03, SD = 22.91, D = 8.47, F(1, 223) = 4.96, p =
.027, ƞ2 = .02). This confirms the efficacy of MemRSA in boosting confidence about memory,
but it should be acknowledged that also PerRSA increased this confidence.
The effectiveness of RSA concerning perception was also confirmed: The NoRSA group
(M = 60.00, SD = 22.66) had statistically significantly lower self-confidence about perception
compared with the PerRSA group (M = 67.80, SD = 22.07, D = 7.80, F(1, 223) = 4.03, p = .046,
ƞ2 = .02), as well as with the MemRSA group (M = 68.04, SD = 23.09, D = 8.04, F(1, 223) =
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4.96, p = .027, ƞ2 = .02). The measures of memory and perception confidence were not corre-
lated (r = .09, ns). In sum, the analyses confirmed the effectiveness of the RSA, both the one
related to feedback on memory and perception.
Main analyses. Descriptive results concerning the mean number of answers consistent
with misinformation are given in Table 1. The range of the means is from 0 to 6.
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, the misinformation effect was replicated: in general, the num-
ber of answers consistent with misinformation was higher in the misled than in the control
group by about two points on a scale from 0 to six (D) = 2.03, F(1, 220) = 138.85, p< .001, ƞ2
= .39). The second hypothesis was also confirmed by means of a planned simple contrast com-
paring the mean yielding to misinformation in the MemRSA and the NoRSA group among
the misled participants: D = -1.29, F(1, 220) = 18.84, p< .001, ƞ2 = .08.
In order to verify the third hypothesis, the results of the PerRSA and the NoRSA group
were compared, and it turned out that memory was significantly more accurate in the PerRSA
than in the NoRSA group (D = -1.33, F(1, 220) = 19.21, p< .001, ƞ2 = .08), confirming this
hypothesis. Moreover, the effectiveness of both RSA procedures seemed not to differ (D =
-0.04, F(1, 220) = 0.02, p = .902, ƞ2 < .01). The differences between RSA groups were not sig-
nificant among the non-misled participants (NoRSA vs. MemRSA: D = 0.26, F(1, 220) = 0.80,
p = .373, ƞ2 < .01; NoRSA vs. PerRSA: D = 0.16, F(1, 220) = 0.24, p = .626, ƞ2 < .01; MemRSA
vs. PerRSA: D = -0.10, F(1, 220) = 0.10, p = .753, ƞ2 < .01).
To verify the mediational models postulated above, mediation analyses were performed, by
means of the software PROCESS v. 3.0 [56]. Two analyses were performed, the first one with
memory confidence as the mediator, the second one—with confidence about perception abil-
ity. The number of answers consistent with misinformation was the dependent variable. RSA
served as the predictor. As it was a nominal variable (three groups: NoRSA, MemRSA and
PerRSA), it was set as a multicategorical predictor in the PROCESS, and indicator contrasts
were used to analyze the differences between groups. The NoRSA served as the reference
group, and the MemRSA and PerRSA groups were compared to it. Confidence intervals for
the indirect effects generated by the bootstrap method were used to determine whether the
indirect effects were significant. 95% confidence intervals were calculated, which correspond
to the alpha level of 0.05. Table 2 presents the results of the mediational analyses.
The mediation: MemRSA > Memory confidence > Yielding to misinformation proved sig-
nificant, as the 95% CIs for the indirect effect did not contain zero. This confirms the Hypothe-
sis 4: the procedure for boosting memory confidence effectively reduced the misinformation
effect, and this effect was mediated by memory confidence but not by perception confidence.
However, a similar Hypothesis 5 concerning the confidence about perception was not con-
firmed, as the confidence intervals for the indirect effects included zero.
In sum, the results of Experiment 1 confirmed almost all the hypotheses. The misinformation
effect was replicated with quite a substantial effect size. Increasing confidence relating to mem-
ory and perception resulted in reducing the vulnerability to give answers based on an external
source of information. Apparently, subjects convinced that their memory and perception ability
is of good quality decided to rely on their own recollections, instead of rejecting them and
choosing to give answers based on other sources. Additional mediational hypotheses were con-
firmed in the case of memory confidence but not perception confidence: it was found that that
MemRSA indeed influences yielding to misinformation via increased memory confidence.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, MemRSA and IndRSA were examined. As in Experiment 1, a replication of
the misinformation effect was expected (Hypothesis 1). Hypotheses 2 and 3 stated that
Inducing resistance to the misinformation effect by means of reinforced self-affirmation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210987 January 22, 2019 6 / 16
MemRSA and IndRSA would reduce the misinformation effect: it was expected that in the
misled group, the mean number of answers consistent with misinformation would be smaller
in the MemRSA and IndRSA groups than in the NoRSA group. In addition, it was expected
that combining both feedbacks: about memory and independence of judgements (Mem-
IndRSA) would be more effective than MemRSA alone (Hypothesis 4a), as well as IndRSA
alone (Hypothesis 4b).
Mediation analyses were performed to verify the hypothesis that the impact of MemRSA on
yielding to misinformation is mediated by memory confidence (Hypothesis 5), as well as that
the impact of IndRSA is mediated by subjectively perceived independence of judgements
(Hypothesis 6). As in Experiment 1, planned contrasts were calculated to analyze the hypothe-
ses concerning differences between groups, and the software PROCESS [56] was used to ana-
lyze the mediation models.
Method
Participants. Four hundred and thirty-six participants, students of various universities as
well as other persons recruited via advertisements in newspapers and in the Internet (304
women and 132 men) took part in the experiment. Their mean age was 23.0 (SD = 6.8, range
15–65 years). The experiment was run in groups of several participants. The sample size was
determined by funds available as the participants were given a reward of about 7 €. Written
signed consent was obtained from all participants.
Materials and procedure. The same materials as in Experiment 1 were used for the misin-
formation procedure and the MemRSA. A procedure for inducing subjectively perceived inde-
pendence of judgements was applied which has already been used in previous research [50,52],
administered after the standard part of RSA consisting in writing down one’s greatest achieve-
ments in life. It consisted of a computerized personality test presented on a computer screen,
on which questions concerning self-efficacy, self-esteem and need for closure were presented,
taken from various questionnaires. After the test, the computer presented ‘the results’, which
were as follows: ‘You are assertive and independent in thinking. You love to present your own
opinions, although sometimes you feel uncertain for no apparent reason. You cope well with
problems in your life, but sometimes you feel upset in social interactions. You don’t like
Table 1. Means (SDs) of number of answers consistent with misinformation across experimental conditions in Experiment 1 (range: 0–6).
Feedback in RSA No misinformation Misinformation Total
No feedback 0.09 (0.29) 3.17 (2.01) 1.67 (2.12)
Memory 0.35 (0.69) 1.88 (1.49) 1.04 (1.36)
Perception 0.25 (0.44) 1.84 (1.73) 1.17 (1.55)
Total 0.24 (0.54) 2.27 (1.83) 0.24 (0.54)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210987.t001
Table 2. Results of mediation analysis—Experiment 1.
Contrasts for the predictor Mediator b [95% CIs]
NoRSA—MemRSA Memory confidence -0.28 [-0.60, -0.03]
Perception confidence -0.07 [-0.27, 0.06]
NoRSA—PerRSA Memory confidence -0.15 [-0.39, 0.06]
Perception confidence -0.12 [-0.37, 0.08]
Predictor: RSA; Dependent variable: Number of answers consistent with misinformation
b: regression coefficient for the indie
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210987.t002
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crowded places. You believe in having own opinions, not relying on others. You believe your
intuition, even if you don’t realize it’. After this, all participants did the memory task as in
Experiment one. Depending on the types of feedback, following experimental groups were cre-
ated: MemRSA, in which positive feedback about memory but not about independence of
judgements was given; IndRSA, in which no feedback about memory but one about the inde-
pendence was presented, and MemIndRSA, in which both types of feedback were
administered.
Memory confidence was measured by means of a 100 mm VAS scale, as in Experiment 1.
In addition, a short questionnaire with five questions, e.g. “I believe that my memory of how
well I remember the content I learned can be judged:”. Answers were given on a 7-point
Likert-like scale, from 1: Very low, to 7: Very high, making a range from 5 to 35 points. Similar
methods were applied to measure subjective independence of judgements: a 100 mm VAS
scale, and a questionnaire with five questions, e.g. “I make decisions on matters that are impor-
tant to me completely on my own”. The scoring was the same as in the case of memory confi-
dence, with the range of answers from 5 to 35. At the end, the participants were debriefed.
The study was based on a 2 × 4 experimental design: misinformation (present / absent) ×
RSA (MemRSA / IndRSA / MemIndRSA / NoRSA).
Results and discussion
Manipulation check. As expected, the level of memory confidence as measured by the
questionnaire was significantly lower in the NoRSA group (M = 21.45, SD = 4.15) compared
to the MemRSA group (M = 23.53, SD = 5.90, D = 2.08, F(1, 432) = 9.66, p = .002, ƞ2 = .02)
and to the MemIndRSA group (M = 23.41, SD = 5.65, D = 1.96, F(1, 432) = 8.49, p = .004, ƞ2 =
.02). The NoRSA and IndRSA groups did not differ significantly (M = 22.15, SD = 3.96,
D = 0.70, F(1, 432) = 1.09, p = .298, ƞ2 < .01).
Similar results were obtained for the memory confidence measured on the VAS scale. The
mean memory confidence in the NoRSA group was 57.57 (SD = 17.21) and was statistically
significantly lower compared to the MemRSA group (M = 64.82, SD = 20.43, D = 7.25, F(1,
430) = 7.34, p = .007, ƞ2 = .02) and the MemIndRSA group (M = 66.37, SD = 24.08, D = 8.80, F
(1, 430) = 10.68, p = .001, ƞ2 = .02). There were no statistically significant differences in mem-
ory confidence between the NoRSA and IndRSA groups (M = 58.74, SD = 16.80, D = 1.17, F(1,
430) = 0.19, p = .665, ƞ2 < .01). In sum, these results confirm the effectiveness of MemRSA on
memory confidence.
The same analyses were performed in order to test the effectiveness of experimental manip-
ulation in inducing a sense of independence. On the VAS scale, the NoRSA group (M = 55.16,
SD = 22.95) scored significantly lower compared to the IndRSA group (M = 63.33, SD = 20.70,
D = 8.17, F(1, 430) = 7.55, p = .006, ƞ2 = .02) and the MemIndRSA group (M = 65.60,
SD = 22.80, D = 10.44, F(1, 430) = 12.34, p< .001, ƞ2 = .03). The NoRSA group was also found
to have a lower subjective independence of judgments compared to the MemRSA group
(M = 65.31, SD = 20.96; D = 8.17, F(1, 430) = 11.84, p = .001, ƞ2 = .03).
As regards subjective independence of judgements as measured by the questionnaire, the
NoRSA group (M = 17.44, SD = 3.79) had significantly lower results compared to the IndRSA
group (M = 21.07, SD = 5.69, D = 3.63, F(1, 430) = 27.50, p< .001, ƞ2 = .06) as well as in com-
parison with the MemIndRSA group (M = 20.96, SD = 6.45, D = 3.52, F(1, 430) = 25.83, p<
.001, ƞ2 = .06). Interestingly, it was again noted that the NoRSA group had a significantly
lower sense of independence compared to MemRSA (M = 19.05, SD = 4.22, D = 1.61, F(1, 430)
= 5.51, p = .019, ƞ2 = .01). This may mean that engaging the participant in self-affirmation,
combined with positive feedback on the functioning of their memories fosters their sense of
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independence in the decisions they make. In general, the obtained results indicate the effec-
tiveness of IndRSA in promoting a sense of being an independent person. Contrary to Experi-
ment 1, the four measures relating to manipulation checks did correlate positively (rs from .20
to .42, all ps< .01).
Main analyses. Descriptive results concerning the mean number of answers consistent
with misinformation are given in Table 3 (range of the means: 0 to 6).
In accordance with Hypothesis 1, the misinformation effect was replicated: the mean num-
ber of answers consistent with misinformation was higher in the misled than in the control
group (D = 1.13, F(1, 428) = 96.74, p< .001; ƞ2 = .18). The second hypothesis was also con-
firmed, as yielding to misinformation in the misled group was significantly lower in the Mem-
RSA group compared to the NoRSA group: D = -0.78, F(1, 428) = 11.50, p< .001, ƞ2 = 0.03.
In order to verify the third hypothesis, the results of the IndRSA and the NoRSA group
were compared, and the significant results confirmed the hypothesis (D = -0.62, F(1, 428) =
7.22; p = .007; ƞ2 = .02). This replicates the results by Szpitalak and Polczyk [50]. Next, yielding
to misinformation was compared between the MemRSA and MemIndRSA groups. The differ-
ence was not significant, leaving Hypothesis 4a without support (D = -0.32, F(1, 428) = 1.91, p
= .168, ƞ2 < .01). To verify Hypothesis 4b, the results of the IndRSA and MemIndRSA groups
were compared. The hypothesis was confirmed (D = -0.48, F(1, 428) = 4.25; p = .040; ƞ2 = .01).
The differences among the RSA groups in the case of non-misled participants were not signifi-
cant: NoRSA vs. MemRSA: D = 0.01, F(1, 428)< 0.01, p = .972, ƞ2 < .01; NoRSA vs. IndRSA:
D = -0.03, F(1, 428) = 0.02, p = .891; ƞ2 < .01, NoRSA vs. MemIndRSA: D = -0.13, F(1, 428) =
0.33, p = .568, ƞ2 < .01; MemRSA vs. IndRSA: D = -0.04, F(1, 428) = 0.03, p = .864, ƞ2 < .01;
MemRSA vs. MemIndRSA: D = -0.14, F(1, 428) = 0.36, p = .546, ƞ2 < .01; IndRSA vs. Mem-
IndRSA: D = -0.10, F(1, 428) = 0.19, p = .667, ƞ2 < .01.
Finally, mediation analyses were performed, in a similar manner as in Experiment 1. The
predictor was set as a multicategorical variable and indicator contrasts were calculated, with
the NoRSA as the reference group, and each of the groups: MemRSA, IndRSA and Mem-
IndRSA groups compared to it. As the mediator variables, aggregated indices of memory con-
fidence and independence of judgements. They were computed as the means of standardized
results on the VAS and questionnaires measures. Table 4 presents the results of mediation
analyses.
Out of six analyses, five confirmed the hypotheses. MemRSA proved to influence yielding
to misinformation via memory confidence. The impact of IndRSA on yielding to misinforma-
tion was indeed mediated by independence of judgements but not by memory confidence.
Finally, both memory confidence and independence of judgements mediated the impact of
MemIndRSA on the misinformation effect. The only unexpected, although statistically signifi-
cant result was that the influence of MemRSA on the misinformation effect was also signifi-
cantly mediated by independence of judgements.
General discussion
The misinformation effect consists in including by the witnesses into their testimony false
information stemming from other sources that a given event. Research presented in this paper
aims at reducing the vulnerability of witnesses to this effect.
First of all, the present research replicated the existence of the misinformation in two exper-
iments. The classical paradigm was applied [6]: the participants watched to a video clip, after
some time they were presented with a description of it which in the misled group contained
misinformation, and subsequently answered a series of questions about the video, including
questions referring to the critical misled items. Participants in the experimental group much
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more often reported information congruent with the misinformation than did the participants
from the control non-misled group. This is yet another warning that the misinformation effect
is a robust phenomenon, stable across various alterations and modifications of the experimen-
tal procedure and across cultures and quite sizeable.
In two experiments presented in this paper, the reinforced self-affirmation was used to
attenuate the misinformation effect. The basic premise for this procedure was the assumption
the there are many participants who at the moment of the final memory test remember both
the original information as well as the misinformation included in the postevent material (not
realizing of course that it is false). As described in Introduction, the existence of participants
aware of the discrepancies between the original and postevent materials is now well established
[5,27,28]. Also, there are data suggesting that the main reason for giving a wrong answer in
this situation is lack of confidence in one’s own memory [5]. The last-mentioned fact was the
basic premise for developing a method for decreasing the tendency to give answers consistent
with the postevent material, not with one’s own correct memory. This method aims at increas-
ing self-confidence. Increased self-confidence should obviously reduce the tendency to rely on
external sources of information if this tendency is caused by low confidence.
The method for increasing self-confidence, which we called reinforced self-affirmation
(RSA) consists of two parts: engaging the participants in self-affirmation (by having them
write down their greatest achievements in life), and a positive feedback. In the present study,
one of the two core elements of RSA, namely positive feedback was analyzed. In the original,
most often researched version of RSA, positive feedback concerned memory. This seemed log-
ical, as the aim of RSA was to reduce the vulnerability to misinformation in the context of wit-
ness testimony. However, it seemed worth researching whether feedback directed at other
cognitive functions, not only memory, would be effective as well. There is at least one reason
to research this: self-affirmation in the classical version of RSA was not related to memory.
The participants just wrote down their greatest achievements in life, and usually they had
nothing to do with memory. Yet, RSA in this form was effective. Existing empirical data sug-
gest that this was not due to the positive feedback directed at memory, because none of the
Table 3. Means (SDs) of number of answers consistent with misinformation across experimental conditions in Experiment 3 (range: 0–6).
Feedback in RSA No misinformation Misinformation Total
No feedback 0.44 (0.76) 2.15 (1.91) 1.28 (1.67)
Memory 0.45 (0.83) 1.37 (1.40) 0.90 (1.23)
Independence 0.41 (0.69) 1.53 (1.17) 0.96 (1.11)
Memory + Independence 0.31 (0.70) 1.05 (1.47) 0.69 (1.22)
Total 0.40 (0.74) 1.53 (1.56) 0.96 (1.34)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210987.t003
Table 4. Results of mediation analysis—Experiment 2.
Contrasts for the predictor Mediator b [95% CIs]
NoRSA—MemRSA Memory confidence -0.36 [-0.56, -0.14]
Independence of judgements -0.17 [-0.34, -0.05]
NoRSA—IndRSA Memory confidence -0.11 [-0.30, 0.05]
Independence of judgements -0.25 [-0.45, -0.08]
NoRSA—MemIndRSA Memory confidence -0.36 [-0.60, -0.13]
Independence of judgements -0.30 [-0.54, -0.12]
Predictor: RSA; Dependent variable: Number of answers consistent with misinformation
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210987.t004
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elements of RSA (self-affirmation and positive feedback) was successful when applied alone
[41,57].
With this in mind, two new versions of RSA were developed, one with feedback concerning
perception abilities, the second—evoking convictions that one is very independent in their
judgements, possesses “independent self”. The results of two experiments presented in this
paper indicate that RSA with feedback concerning perception was effective and did not signifi-
cantly differ in efficacy from the classical version with feedback aiming at memory. RSA with
feedback promoting a sense of being an independent person was also effective, and again no
significant difference in efficacy emerged between feedback concerning memory and indepen-
dence. However, combining feedbacks concerning memory and independence was more
effective that independence alone, although it seemed no more effective than feedback con-
cerning memory alone.
In general, these results indicate that it is not necessary for the feedback to be directed at
memory, in order to be effective in immunizing against misinformation in the context of
memory reports. It must be stressed however that areas chosen at the present research to be
reinforced by positive feedback were not very remote from abilities that may be important for
an eyewitness. Obviously, perception abilities are crucial in this context. Also, the ability to
rely on one’s own ideas is very important in order not to be suggestible and dependent on
external cues while giving a memory report.
Interestingly however, combining inducing confidence about memory and independence
of judgements was no more effective than increasing confidence about memory. It may be that
boosting self-confidence has its limits. It may also be that it is enough for the witness to reach
some level of self-confidence—boosting confidence over and beyond this point does not
improve the resistance further.
In sum, the take home message from these results, combined with the results obtained by
Szpitalak and Polczyk [52] is that future efforts aiming at developing a version of RSA which
could be used in real interrogations should include a positive feedback aiming at cognitive
functions and abilities which are not far away from the reality of giving memory reports.
One of the basic premises for the present research was that there are participants who, at
the moment of the final memory test for the original material, have a correct memory both for
this original material, as well as regards misinformation. The existence of such participants
was not directly verified in the experiments presented in this paper. The procedure was quite
complex and difficult for the participants. Adding yet another element to it, as required by the
four-stage procedure for detecting the awareness of discrepancies, would be too complicated.
This is an important point as the main hypothesis posits that RSA actually only works in the
case of participants aware of discrepancies between the original and postevent materials.
Boosting self-confidence may make such participants to rely on their own recollections. If
someone does not remember the relevant content of the original material, increased confi-
dence is of little help. In other words, it was assumed that RSA only works on a fraction of par-
ticipants who are aware of the discrepancies, therefore experience confusions and may start to
doubt their own memories. RSA may help such participants to restore confidence that their
own memories as regards the original material are correct. This crucial assumption—that RSA
only works in the case of participants who are aware of the discrepancies—was not tested in
present experiments. There is however data to confirm this basic assumption: Szpitalak and
Polczyk [50] were able to show that RSA was only effective in the group of participants aware
of the discrepancies between the original and postevent materials.
Another basic premise in the present research was the assumption that its efficacy is
based on increasing confidence. This hypothesis was confirmed by the mediation analyses:
in most cases they yielded results consistent with this hypothesis: self-confidence and self-
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independence proved to mediate the impact of RSA on resisting misinformation. In sum, the
various pieces of the puzzle seem to fit together: there are data to confirm: (a) the existence of
persons aware of the discrepancies between the original and postevent materials [5,27,28]; (b)
the fact that RSA is only effective among those aware of the discrepancies [50]; (c) the main
reason to reject one’s own memory is lack of confidence [5]; and (d) RSA indeed works via
increased confidence (present data).
One of the consequences of the fact that RSA is only effective in groups of participants who
are aware of the discrepancies between the original and postevent may be that it is actually
more powerful than the rather low effect sizes obtained in the present study suggest. If the
experiment was performed only on aware participants, these effect sizes would most probably
be higher. On the other hand, however, this means that RSA would be effective only in the case
of a real eyewitness who does remember a given event. This limitation of RSA is difficult to
overcome to overcome: it simply is not designed to increase memory. It is designed to help wit-
nesses who are confused to help give testimonies based on their own knowledge. Also, RSA
does not influence encoding nor storage, as it was administered just before the final memory
test. However, there are data suggesting that it is also effective when placed between presenting
the original material and exposing the participant to the postevent information [41,57].
The sample sizes used in both experiments are worth a comment. In the first experiment,
students of secondary schools took part and their age of the participants ranged from 15 to 18
years (mean age: 16.6). In Experiment 2, students of high schools and other persons were tested,
and they were older, ranging in age from 15 to 65 years (mean = 23). RSA was effective in both
groups which which suggests that the results concerning RSA generalize across populations.
Limitations and future directions
The most basic limitation of the present study which immediately calls for future research is
the fact that it is basic in its nature. It shows some phenomenon—increasing self-confidence
reduces vulnerability to misinformation. However, in the present form it cannot possibly be
used in any real situations. It would be very unusual to have a real witness write down their
greatest achievements in life, let alone faking them by means of giving manipulated positive
feedback. Developing a version of RSA which could be used in real life settings is an important
task for future research and the present results may help in it.
RSA consists of two elements, but in the present research, only one of it—positive feedback
was systematically researched. Self-affirmation was not manipulated, and it had the same form
in both experiments. A better design would have systematically varied the both factors: various
kinds of self-affirmation and positive feedback. This however, combined with the misinforma-
tion factor which also requires a control group, would result in a too big number of groups.
However, it is necessary to study various kinds of self-affirmation as well.
The effect sizes concerning the efficacy of RSA were not large suggesting that the decrease
of suggestibility resulting from it is not impressive. However, one can argue that there are few
injustices more severe than being wrongly convicted, especially for a serious crime. Trying to
save this fate even to several people is worth undertaking.
Another possible limitation of the current study is the fact that it only included one type of
false memories—the misinformation effect, that is, errors caused by external misinformation.
Whether RSA would be effective in the case of other kinds of false memories (e.g. self-gener-
ated ones) remains to be examined.
It would be interesting to examine whether RSA also increases confidence in false memo-
ries. This important problem cannot be resolved with the present data as no confidence ratings
were collected during the memory test. This remains an important issue for further research.
Inducing resistance to the misinformation effect by means of reinforced self-affirmation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210987 January 22, 2019 12 / 16
Another limitation concerning the RSA, affecting first of all the interpretation of the media-
tion analyses is connected with the method of boosting memory confidence: It consisted of a
word-list recall exercise. The participant compared his or her own score to an ostensible low
general average. This means that the magnitude of the increase of memory confidence was
positively correlated with real memory abilities: participants with poor results on the task were
closer to the “average” score than those with good results. As a consequence, the pre-existing
memory abilities may have been the real predictor of memory confidence, as well as of yielding
to misinformation. The same applies to PerRSA. However, the number of words actually
remembered, and the number of differences between pictures correctly solved did not corre-
late with memory confidence, perception confidence, and yielding to misinformation.
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